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Accepting that successful ‘development’ is premised on a population’s participation in a 
collective undertaking, we must understand urban residents’ interactions and ambitions. 
In African cities being transformed by geographic and social mobility, it is unclear what 
forms of inclusion, solidarity or mutual recognition are desired or possible among those 
who live there. This paper argues that the pursuit of three objectives—profit, protection 
and passage—is shaping these cities’ social formations in ways that limit the ability of 
official and non-official institutions to interweave popular aspirations—however 
temporarily—to promote a common and mutually beneficial future. The paper starts 
from the premise that the novelty of the emerging social forms within Africa’s cities 
requires a willingness to induce: to build a conceptual vocabulary of belonging 
reflecting practices of those living in and moving through Africa’s cities. Only after 
doing this will we have the building blocks for further debate. With this in mind, the 
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paper works towards a pair of interrelated tasks. The first is to challenge three premises 
often informing discussions of mobility and urban politics: (i) the presence of a 
dominant host community or political order; (ii) that cities are destinations and not 
points of transit; and (iii) that state institutions are the primary source of exclusion and 
the most potent tool for fostering inclusion in a collective endeavour. Second, it 
considers one form of membership and inclusion that can emerge where the 
presumptions outlined above do not hold. In doing so, it points to a kind of ‘tactical 
cosmopolitanism’, a set of discourses and practices that can subvert ethnic or national 
chauvinism and restrictive migration or anti-urbanization policies and practices. 
Drawing primarily on examples from Johannesburg, it shows how migrants negotiate 
partial inclusion in transforming societies without becoming bounded by them. The 
paper ends by reflecting briefly on the challenges such tactics pose for generating a 
collective urban project. 
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I have been here for six years, but I don’t think any right thinking person 
would want to be South African... They are just so contaminated. 
Lesotho migrant in Johannesburg, 2005 
(Author interview) 
1  African urbanization and the meaning of belonging 
Histories of mobility and marginalization have generated overlapping systems of 
exchange, meaning and privilege in Africa’s primary urban centres. Rather than 
coalescing into discrete communities, many of these cities face heightening disparities 
of wealth and ever diversifying linguistic, ethnic and national heterogeneity, all cross-
cut by shifting gender roles, life trajectories and inter-generational tensions (see for 
example Diouf 2000; Sommers 2001; Tomlinson et al. 2003; Winkler 2006). Moreover, 
through geographic movement—into, out of, and within cities—urban spaces are 
increasingly the loci of economic and normative ties with home villages and diasporas 
spread (and spreading) across the continent and beyond (Diouf 2000; Geschiere 2005).  
Accepting that successful ‘development’ is premised on a population’s participation in a 
collective undertaking (see Evans 2002), we must understand urban residents’ 
interactions and ambitions. As effective engagement and mutual recognition are not 
something we can impose on communities (Evans 2002: 141; Potts 2008), we must 
recognize, as Kabeer (2005: 1) does, that ‘[we] do not know what citizenship means to 
people—particularly people whose status as citizens is either non-existent or extremely 
precarious—or what these meanings tell us about the goal of building inclusive 
societies’. In these agglomerations of geographic and social mobility, it is unclear what 
forms of inclusion, solidarity or mutual recognition are desired by those who live there. 
This paper argues that the pursuit of three objectives—profit, protection and passage—
is shaping these cities’ social formations in ways that limit the ability of official and 
non-official institutions to interweave these aspirations—however temporarily—to 
promote a common and mutually beneficial future. 
Given the lack of systematic accounts from across the continent, this paper starts from 
the premise that the novelty of the emerging social forms within Africa’s cities requires 
a willingness to induce: to build a conceptual vocabulary of belonging reflecting 
practices of those living in and moving through Africa’s cities. Only after doing this 
will we have the building blocks for further debate. With this in mind, this paper works 
towards a pair of modest, interrelated objectives. The first is to challenge three premises 
often informing discussions of mobility and urban politics: (i) the presence of a 
dominant host community or political order; (ii) that cities are destinations and not 
points of transit; and (iii) that state institutions are the primary source of exclusion and 
the most potent tool for fostering inclusion in a collective endeavour. The second, more 
speculative, objective is to consider one form of membership and inclusion that can 
emerge where the presumptions outlined above do not hold. In doing so, I point to what 
I have termed ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’, a set of discourses and practices that can 
subvert ethnic or national chauvinism and restrictive migration or anti-urbanization 
policies and practices. Drawing primarily on examples from Johannesburg, I show how 
migrants negotiate partial inclusion in transforming societies without becoming  
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bounded by them. The paper ends by reflecting briefly on the challenges such tactics 
pose for generating a collective urban project. 
2  Reading and revealing urban inclusion  
This essay draws on an ecumenical set of data in illustrating sub-national and 
transnational migration dynamics and the socio-institutional responses to them. Most of 
the information reflected here stems from migration-related research in southern and 
eastern Africa, beginning with Johannesburg, undertaken by the author between 2002 
 
Table 1 
Johannesburg sample (%), by nationality and neighbourhood, 2006 




African total  South Africa  Total 
Berea 20.9  12.9  0.0  20.0 12.2  34.0  17.4 
Bertrams 7.5  15.8  0.0 0.0    7.9  7.3  7.7 
Bez. Valley  0.0  17.8  0.0 6.7  5.7 3.1  5.1 
Fordsburg 0.0  0.0  10.8 0.0    3.1  8.4  4.3 
Mayfair 0.0  0.0  88.7 6.7  25.5  11.0  22.1 
Rosettenville 5.9  53.5  0.0 13.3  19.0 17.8  18.8 
Yeoville 65.6   0.0  0.5 53.3  26.7 18.3  24.8 
N 253  202  186  15  648  191  847 
  
Table 2 
Maputo sample (%), by nationality and neighbourhood, 2006 




total Mozambique Total 
Bairro Central  2.6  31.5 6.9  6.9  10.6  4.6  8.7 
Alto Mae  1.3  3.4  0.7 6.9  1.9  9.2 4.3 
Malhangalene 2.6  10.1  2.1 0.0  3.9  4.1 3.9 
Malanga 5.9  4.5  4.9 6.9  5.3  15.4 8.5 
Maxaquene 1.3  4.5  3.5  3.4  2.9  14.4  6.6 
Urbanizacao 2.6  2.2  0.7 0.0  1.7  5.1 2.8 
Polana Cemento  13.8  3.4  4.9 6.9  8.0  11.8 9.2 
Benfica 17.8  13.5  14.6 6.9  15.0  16.4  15.4 
Laulane 11.8  1.1  9.0  0.0 7.7  12.8  9.4 
Matola 37.5  24.7  48.6 24.1  37.7  0.0 25.6 
Xipamanine 2.6  1.1  4.2 37.9  5.3  6.2  5.6 
N 152  89  144  29  414  195  609 
 
Table 3 
Nairobi sample (%), by nationality and neighbourhood, 2006 




total Kenya  Total 
Eastleigh 42.8  98.6  0.7 28.6  46.6 25.4 38.4 
Githurai  13.2 0.0 7.5 14.3  7.3 13.1  9.5 
Kawangware 15.1  0.7  38.4 21.4  18.1 24.4 20.5 
Kayole  7.5 0.0 0.0 7.1  2.8  13.4 6.9 
Komarock 6.9  0.7  36.3 21.4  14.7  7.6 11.9 
Umoja  14.5 0.0 0.0   0.0  5.0 3.8  4.5 
Zimmerman 0.0  0.0  17.1 7.1  5.6  12.4 8.2 
N  159 145 146  14  464  291  755  
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and 2008. This includes new survey research undertaken in 2006, complemented by 
formal and informal interviews with migrants, service providers, advocates and local 
government representatives. The 2006 survey was conducted with partners in 
Johannesburg, Maputo, Lubumbashi and Nairobi. This essay draws on data from three 
of the four survey cities: Johannesburg, Maputo and Nairobi. A brief overview of the 
nationalities surveyed and of the neighbourhoods in which we worked is included in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
In all instances we sampled in areas with significant migrant populations, a factor that 
undoubtedly points to heightened transience while excluding wealthier, more settled 
communities. However, within the sites selected for the surveys we used a mix of 
random and cluster sampling to ensure reasonable levels of randomness and 
representativity. As such, the data provide critical illustrations of trends and challenges 
while not necessarily reflecting the cities’ demographic composition. They also 
demonstrate the value of comparative work on experiences of migration, highlighting 
important characteristics and differences among international migrants, recently 
urbanized citizens and more sedentary population groups.  
3  Reconsidering belonging in Africa’s cities  
This section briefly challenges three of the primary premises that inform discussions 
about inclusive cities and, more broadly, inclusive citizenship. Whether explicit or not, 
these presumptions typically inform discussions of how to build effective institutions, 
and a range of other policies including housing, policing, health care and investments in 
physical infrastructure. 
3.1  The presence of a self-identified host community or dominant culture  
Much of the writing on migration and urbanization explores how host communities 
make space—or do not—for the new arrivals, both domestic and international. Beneath 
these debates over xenophobic exclusion or cultural accommodation is a presumption that 
there is a set of identifiable, dominant values and institutions that are being challenged 
and reshaped by heightening social heterogeneity. The data presented below suggest we 
should be wary of ascribing undue social coherence to the cities’ current populations, 
populations characterized as much by ethnic heterogeneity, economic disparity and 
cultural pastiche as by solidarity (see Larkin 2004; Mbembe 2004; Simone 2004). 
The 2006 survey data illustrate the degree to which the urban population is also a ‘new’ 
population. In Johannesburg, only 16 per cent of the non-citizens we surveyed had been 
in the inner city for ten or more years. More surprisingly, only in Maputo had more than 
50 per cent of ‘hosts’ (i.e. citizens) lived in the city for more than a decade (55 per cent 
in Maputo, 46 per cent in Nairobi and 48 per cent in Johannesburg). Instead of a vision 
of hosts and new arrivals, in all three cities there are relatively small differences in the 
time the two groups have occupied the city (see Table 4). Equally important, both 
citizens and non-nationals move frequently after coming to the city, trends retarding the 
formation of collective organization and solidarity. (In Johannesburg, non-nationals 
have moved an average of 3.1 times, citizens 2.0 times. In Nairobi, the ratio is 1.5 to 
2.0. For Maputo, both non-nationals and citizens average 1.8).  
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If nothing else, these data illustrate the degree to which long-term residents, domestic 
migrants and non-citizens are simultaneously finding their ways in a new (and ever-
changing) social landscape. Even domestic migrants may have as little in common with 
the people they find in the city as those coming from across international boundaries. In 
Johannesburg, the bases for commonality are also remarkably limited. When asked, 
29.9 per cent of the citizenry mentioned Zulu as their mother tongue, 19.9 per cent 
Xhosa, 11.5 per cent Sotho, 7.9 per cent Tswana, 6.8 per cent English and 2.6 per cent 
Afrikaans. While Protestantism initially suggests some basis for commonality (59.7 per 
cent of Johannesburg’s citizenry reported being Protestant, compared with 18.5 per cent 
having no religion, 14.1 per cent Catholic and 6.8 per cent Muslim), a closer look 
reveals enormous diversity and, occasionally, hostility among the city’s Protestant sects 
that range from Anglican and Lutheran to myriad charismatic and born-again churches. 
Table 4 
Average length of time (years) in city among ‘host’ populations and non-nationals, 2006 
 Hosts  Non-nationals 
Johannesburg 10  6 
Maputo 14  5 
Nairobi 10  7 
 
3.2  Cities as destinations  
The rapid growth of cities across the African continent, as elsewhere in the world, is 
often taken as evidence of ever-growing urban communities. While millions are moving 
to cities, we must not assume that the first move will be the last. Repeated movements 
within the city, oscillating movements between rural and urban areas, and passages 
through cities all question the intention or ability to achieve a life and livelihoods 
sustained by a single urban centre.  
Movement, in all of its forms, challenges institutions charged with tracking and 
responding to urban populations. Presumptions of a sedentary population only make it 
more difficult to respond effectively to a population that moves with considerable 
frequency into, within and out of cities. Perhaps more importantly, regular movement 
potentially heightens people’s emotional distance from their neighbours and the physical 
space they occupy. At the very least, it retards the formation of the kind of Putnamian 
social capital much of the development literature identifies as a prerequisite for 
development. Although people move with varying degrees of frequency—again, 
Johannesburg tops the chart—it is difficult to speak of a stable and potentially coherent 
community. 
Connections and regular shifts between rural (or peri-urban) and urban areas are a 
critical factor in slowing the emergence of an urban citizenry. For many moving for 
work, the primary motivation is profit and the need to extract urban resources to 
subsidize the ‘real’ life they live elsewhere. Indeed, in many instances spouses and 
children remain elsewhere while single men and women earn money in the cities to 
sustain them. Although urban residents may establish second urban families, in many 
instances social, ethnic and political ties to rural areas prevent full social integration into 
urban communities. The intention to retire in the countryside also leads many to 
minimize their financial and emotional investments in urban areas.   
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In some instances, significant numbers of foreign-born population—or non-local 
citizens—have arrived in the city seeking protection from conflict and persecution. In 
Luanda, Lubumbashi, Kampala, and to some extent Maputo, urban growth has 
significantly accelerated as people have sought refuge from violence elsewhere in the 
country. Cities like Nairobi, Johannesburg and Dar es Salaam have also received large 
numbers of international migrants fleeing conflicts across the border. As with other 
migrants, refugees often see cities of residence as temporary alternatives to camp-based 
living. When the war is over in their home countries, many will return to their 
communities while others will stay on in urban centres or move elsewhere. Others 
remain in the city with the hope of being resettled in Europe or North America. 
Table 5 
Expectation among non-nationals and nationals as to the place of residence 
in two years’ time (percentage of sample), 2006* 
 Johannesburg  Maputo  Nairobi 
   Non-nationals   
Where I am now   47.5  56.2  50.5 
In another part of current country  9.4  2.9  7.8 
In community or country of origin  12.9  1.0  9.1 
In a third country  16.0  5.3  23.5 
N 643  413  463 
   Nationals   
Where I am now  46.6  71.3  72.9 
In another part of home country  31.2  8.2  12.3 
In community of origin  3.7  3.6  4.8 
In a third country  3.7  2.0  2.4 
N 189  195  291 
Note:   Totals do not equal 100 per cent due to exclusion of ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘Other responses’. 
Table 6 
Response among non-nationals and nationals  
as to where children should grow up (percentage of sample), 2006 
 Johannesburg  Maputo  Nairobi 
   Non-nationals   
Where I am now  30.8  56.9  27.2 
In another part of current country  4.1  1.7  6.7 
In community or country of origin  36.3  5.6  25.3 
In a third country  20.5  11.1  38.9 
N 643  413  463 
   Nationals   
Where I am now  36.0  68.2  71.8 
In another part of current country  24.9  13.3  16.2 
In community or country of origin  31.7  8.2  8.6 
In a third country  5.3  2.6  1.7 
N 189  195  291 
Note:   Totals do not equal 100% due to exclusion of ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘Other responses’, including 
responses from those without children. 
                                                 
*   It is worth noting that in the 2003 iteration of the survey, 24.7 per cent of the foreign-born population 
in Johannesburg expected to be in a third country within two years. It is not clear what accounts for 
the rapid decrease between 2003 and 2006. Given the recent violence around Johannesburg in May 
2008, it is reasonable to expect that the percentage will have climbed again.  
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Cities as places of refugee resettlement, as discussed above, are but the most overt 
example of a broader phenomenon: of seeing (and using) cities as gateways. The data in 
Table 5 indicates how fluid urban populations are and how cities are, in Castells’ (2004) 
words, places of flows. Although many people will be unable to make lives for 
themselves elsewhere, the orientation to extra-local sites remains. 
Even in Maputo, the study’s most demographically stable city, significant numbers of 
people—both citizens and foreign—wish their children to be raised elsewhere (see 
Table 6). If the best indicator of a population’s commitment to a city is its desire to see 
its children raised there, then there are strong reasons to reconsider how dedicated many 
urban populations are to staying in and improving their cities of residence.  
Given the population’s volatility, social networks within cities are spread thinly across 
many people and places. It is little surprise, then, that people sampled in our surveys 
show remarkably low levels of trust between ethnic and national groups and, 
surprisingly, within them. There are ethnic and immigrant networks, but these are 
typically limited to assisting others only to overcome immediate risks, when there are 
direct, mutual returns, or if a corpse needs returning to a country or community of origin 
(Andersson 2006; Madsen 2004). Even among citizens, levels of social capital—trust of 
each other and of their public institutions—are remarkably low (see also Putnam 2007). 
Among neither migrants nor the nominal host population can we speak of a community 
or set of overlapping institutions that can be opened (or is being forced open). This 
heterogeneity allows for a de facto degree of permeability and coexistence, but without 
an enacted or articulated collective awareness. 
4  Modes of belonging and the challenge of participation 
Africa’s urban centres undeniably exhibit socioeconomic and political fragmentation, 
marginalization and violent exclusion. As a result, millions of people live in slums with 
tenuous access to the minimum requirements of survival (UNCHS 2003). This poverty, 
violence, exploitation and political marginalization increasingly shape the activities, 
expectations and ambitions of cities’ newcomers and long-term residents (Mbembe 
2001; Simone 2004). But despite the traumas, trials and marginalization they offer, 
Africa’s cities are not only sites of exclusion. If they were, growth rates would have 
stabilized or declined: people would stay ‘home’, return to their countries and 
communities of origin, or move elsewhere. This expanding presence of an ever-
diversifying population suggests a kind of de facto inclusivity in which most people are 
able to meet their survival needs. The question, foregrounded by the statistics provided 
above, is: within what systems of power and authority are people being included? I wish 
also to suggest that what at first appears to be exclusion—social, legal or political 
marginalization—may be the result of novel strategies of inclusion. I discuss these 
further in the remainder of this paper.  
My efforts are intended to reveal at least two dimensions of inclusion and belonging that 
are noticeably absent in my review of the planning literature (although they do appear, 
albeit under different labels, in sociological and anthropological literature on migration 
and cosmopolitanism). The first continues the reasoning outlined above, by challenging 
the mutual exclusivity of inclusion and exclusion. Here we see emerging forms of 
conscious self-exclusion reflected in the statement made by the Lesotho migrant  
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included as an epigraph preceding this text. This is at once a form of self-alienation—
often in response to ascribed alienation—and one of inclusion. 
In response to the violence, abuse and discrimination many foreigners experience in 
Johannesburg, they have developed a rhetoric of self-exclusion that fetishizes their 
position as the permanent outsider or wanderer (see Malauene 2004). So rather than 
striving to integrate or assimilate, non-nationals’ extended interactions with South 
Africans are leading to a reification of differences and a counter-idiom of transience and 
superiority. Whatever the source of exclusion, only 45 per cent of foreigners we 
surveyed felt they were part of South African society: 38.6 per cent among Congolese, 
and 54.1 per cent among the Somali population (95.7 per cent of South Africans felt 
they were ‘in’). (In Maputo, 60.3 per cent of foreigners felt they were part of 
Mozambican society. In Nairobi, the figure fell below that of Johannesburg, to 42.8 per 
cent.) Fittingly, foreigners often brand locals with the same flaws ascribed to them: 
dishonesty, violence and vectors of disease. Few trust the host population, and only a 
small minority speaks of close relationships with them. In South Africa, this is 
complemented by a sense that citizens are uneducated and do not appreciate the 
opportunities they have for education. Moreover, they are seen as promiscuous (female 
promiscuity is particularly jarring), overly tolerant (especially regarding the acceptance 
of homosexuality), and unreligious; imagining themselves as superior and worldly, they 
are thought to look down on the communities around them. While many more 
foreigners would like their children to learn English, Portuguese or another ‘local’ 
language, they are clear that this is only for practical purposes. Among their worst fears 
are that their children consider themselves as local. 
Denying even the desire to integrate and settle, foreign populations in Johannesburg and 
elsewhere are shaping their own forms of transient belonging; a way of living in the city 
without become a permanent part of it. Clinging to the status afforded those belonging 
to the ‘mobile classes’ (see Bauman 2000), migrants hover above the soil by retaining 
loyalties to their countries of origin and orient themselves towards a future outside their 
country of residence. This emerges from a combination of both original intent (i.e., why 
people came to a given city), and a counter-response to the hostility or exclusion they 
face when they arrive. Whatever its origins, many migrants deny ever having held 
aspirations of assimilation or permanent settlement (i.e. total inclusion). Others claim 
they would refuse such opportunities were they available. For them, status as 
allochthons is not a badge of shame, but is instead a self-authored form of inclusion into 
a world that is somehow far greater and more valuable than the city in which they live. 
So instead of transplantation and legibility to the society and political systems in which 
they live, many foreigners and newcomers alike strive for a kind of usufruct rights: a 
form of exclusion that is at least partially compatible with social and political 
marginalization. 
The second point emerges from my earlier interrogation into what, exactly, people are 
seeking or becoming included in. In African cities—as elsewhere—inclusion is 
something more than claiming a ‘right to the city’ or becoming part of a stable urban 
community. We must avoid assuming the existence of such communities, but also 
recognize that for many domestic and (especially) international migrants, the process of 
moving to the city—or towards larger, more networked cities—is also, if not primarily, 
a step into a global ‘imaginary’. Through urbanization, they not only hope to access a 
place to stay or work, but also global youth culture, new universal urban lifestyles 
(however understood), or, more concretely, opportunities for onward journeys. Whether  
8 
or not they ever realize these ambitions, the city is nevertheless a space where one can 
access trading and travel opportunities unavailable in rural settings, or even in the 
capital cities of less economically networked countries and communities. 
But for relatively poor migrants, the global cultures they wish to join are not always the 
same as those that Ong (1999) and Sassen (2002) describe. These may colour their 
imaginations, but the networks they join are also those shaped by their diasporas of kin, 
co-ethnics, co-religionists and co-nationals. Given that the cities in which these 
networks exist function as primary nodes of communication, banking and cultural 
exchange, the movements of people into cities represent what Portes (1997) terms a 
‘globalization from below’. Inclusion in their networks may facilitate an initial 
relocation and provide the resources (material and otherwise) needed for business 
formation, sustenance and onward travel. Where integration or inclusion into a city of 
residence is either impossible or undesirable, these decentred, globalized networks may 
represent an urbanite’s most significant form of membership (see Kankonde 
forthcoming). Even when not achieved, it may continue to serve as an aspirational ideal 
that shapes other more localized strategies and struggles. 
The characteristics I have just described—the desire for usufruct rights, self-alienation 
and global membership—are all visible in what Haupt and I have termed ‘tactical 
cosmopolitanism’ (Landau and Haupt forthcoming). As non-citizens encounter and 
attempt to overcome opposition to their presence, they draw on a variegated language of 
belonging that makes claims to the city while positioning them in an ephemeral, 
superior and unrooted condition where they can escape localized social and political 
obligations. The remainder of this paper explores the content of this fragmented and 
heterogeneous discourse. In doing so, it illustrates foreigners’ agency in mitigating 
discrimination by at once inserting themselves into city life and distancing themselves 
from it. 
Unlike theoretical or ‘high’ cosmopolitanism, its tactical variety need not be grounded 
on normative ideas of ‘openness’ or tolerance. Rather, migrants practically and 
rhetorically draw on heterogeneous systems of rights to position themselves, however 
shallowly, in the networks and spaces needed to achieve specific practical goals. This is 
a ‘decentred’ approach that emphasizes individualism, generality and universality, all 
‘central pillars’ of cosmopolitanism (see Pogge 1992: 48; also Roudometof 2005: 121). 
However, they do so variably and often contradictorily, furthering their personal needs 
and interests without necessarily generating an inclusive ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’. 
This leaves them, in Friedman’s words, ‘participating in many worlds without becoming 
part of them’ (cited in Vertovec 2006: 3-10; see also Simmel 1964). 
Kihato’s (forthcoming) work on migrant associations in the inner city describes Awelah, 
a Johannesburg-based group offering up a new kind of Pan-Africanism. In the words of 
its founder, quoted in the paper:  
We want to shift our patriotism to the continent, not to a country. We 
Africans share a history together; we are bound together by a 
neocolonialism. When you dig up these feelings all Africans have the same 
history. This is the link that we have got now, we are African even though 
we butcher each other but we are African. In our day-to-day living we are 
all confronted with problems of nationality, ethnicity and so on. But when  
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you have this [broader African] perspective you do not see these problems 
anymore. 
There is more here than a desire to build a community of all Africans. Rather, the 
evocations of Pan-Africanism—drawn from 1960s liberation philosophy, Mbeki’s 
notion of African Renaissance, and the rhetoric of Africa’s World Cup to be played in 
South Africa in 2010—are particularly designed to erode the barriers that separate 
foreigners from South Africans. By helping South Africans to realize connections to 
their continental kin, they undermine the legitimacy of any barriers to inclusion that 
South Africans may erect in front of them. Ironically, the foundation for such 
mobilization remains firmly rooted in a transnational articulation of Ivorian identity, as 
most of the new members come from there. Through this rhetoric migrants adopt a de 
facto cosmopolitanism that demonstrates a willingness to engage a plurality of cultures, 
openness to hybridity, and multiple identities (see Hannerz 1990: 239). However, this is 
not an openness without boundaries, but rather one that draws on multiple identities 
simultaneously without ever accepting the overarching authority or power of one. 
Importantly, their rhetoric is distinctly non-transnational. Nowhere does this new 
language speak of maintaining ties to a specific location. Rather, it is a tactical effort to 
gain access to the city, but without a view of becoming exclusively or even partially 
bound to it or to any other concrete locale. 
Elsewhere, migrant groups have used South Africa’s relatively liberal, if inconsistently 
applied,- asylum laws and its Constitution to claim rights of residence and work. 
However, few refugees use an abstract language of refugee rights to justify their 
position in the country. Rather, they call on norms of reciprocity—claiming rights to the 
city (and the country) based on their countries’ contributions to ending apartheid. 
Nigerians, for example, will often claim (with some justification) that African National 
Congress (ANC) activists were given full university scholarships in the 1970s and 
1980s, opportunities that were not always available to citizens. Mozambicans, 
Zimbabweans and even Namibians claim that they personally suffered from wars tied to 
South Africa’s anti-communist campaign and efforts to destroy ANC or Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK) strongholds within their countries. If they did not experience the war 
firsthand, then they were deprived by an economy that had been destroyed by years of 
fighting. Others plausibly argue that because South African business derives so many 
profits from investments in their countries—in the past and now—they have a reciprocal 
right to South Africa’s territory and wealth. In this way, South Africa’s own 
transnationalism—past and present—serves as justification for transcending national 
residential restrictions. Although these are peculiarly South African examples, migrants 
in other cities refer to ill-defined ideas of ubuntu or African fraternity to legitimize their 
presence. 
Perhaps the most powerful mode of transcendent belonging comes from religion. The 
ever-expanding pool of foreign-run Pentecostal churches operating within 
Johannesburg’s inner city (and elsewhere on the continent) is fashioning an 
organizational form that at once bridges barriers with South Africans (and South Africa) 
while preparing people for a life beyond South Africa. Indeed, in many cases, the 
churches prepare people for a life beyond any territorially bounded nation. Many of 
these offer up the ‘health and wealth’ promises seen elsewhere in evangelical 
communities, alluring alternatives to the material deprivation many migrants experience 
in their current locations.  
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Although the churches often speak of helping to build strong communities in 
Johannesburg and are often presumed to do so by outside observers (see Winkler 2006), 
the practices are often quite the opposite. In many churches, the South African 
representation is small and also disaffected. Where larger numbers do attend, the 
solidarity achieved during the service is short-lived, with nationals and non-nationals 
quickly dividing on the pavement after the service. Moreover, many church leaders 
seem content to ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s’, and stay out of local 
politics. 
Like their parishioners, many church leaders also see their presence in Johannesburg as 
part of their passage elsewhere. With their strong links to communities in Nigeria, 
Ghana and the United States, the churches rely heavily on connections outside the 
country. For many of the churches’ founders, South Africa is primarily a place where 
they can enter global discourse and influence the lives of people across the continent 
and beyond. In the words of the Nigerian pastor at the Mountain of Fire and Miracles 
Church, ‘Africa is shaped like a pistol and South Africa is the mouth from where you 
can shoot out the word of God’. And, consequently, anyone doing the work of God has 
divine right to South African territory. But this right, and his charisma, comes not from 
embedding himself within South Africa, but from remaining above it. While church 
ideology may potentially generate community, the new rapidly growing Charismatic 
churches are far too flexible to offer a coherent, stable alternative organizational form. 
Instead, the churches are often functional units, helping people to find jobs, transcend 
boundaries, or find ways (physically or spiritually) out of Johannesburg’s hardships. If 
successful, these resources often physically help people out of the city (or at least the 
inner city) and onto more prosperous grounds. 
4  Conclusion: Belonging and participation in African cities  
The forms of belonging we see in many African cities are, as Beck (2004: 134) 
suggests, often ‘side effects’ of efforts to achieve other economic, social and 
occasionally political goals. As such, they do not reflect a ‘strategic’ movement or 
alternative, articulated and centralized order. Rather, they are a motley collection of 
actions undertaken by groups that are often divided by language, religion, legal status 
and mutual distrust. Critically, many of these groups remain only loosely committed to 
long-term change in the places where they operate.   
Unlike the sans papiers in France or Latino movements in the United States, migrant 
organizations in Johannesburg—and to some extent elsewhere on the continent—have 
rarely fought for formal rights to the city or for formal political incorporation. Where 
such movements exist, they represent a minority voice. Instead of claiming membership 
and rooting their futures in a single city, many migrants are careful to avoid the mutual 
obligations and politics that come from close association with other ‘exiles’ (see 
Mang’ana 2004; Misago 2005). Although there are instances in which migrant groups 
assert a collective (usually national) identity, these are often based on instrumental and 
short-lived associations. Amisi and Ballard’s (2005) work on refugee associations 
throughout South Africa, for example, finds an almost universal tendency towards 
repeated reconfiguration and fragmentation. As Götz and Simone suggest (2003: 125), 
‘these formations embody a broad range of tactical abilities aimed at maximizing 
economic opportunities through transversal engagements across territories and separate  
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arrangements of powers’. Rather than integrating or assimilating, the form and rhetoric 
of organization reinforces their position as the permanent outsiders in ways that 
‘[distance] him or her from all connections and commitments’ (Said 2001: 183). As 
Simmel (1964) notes, these strangers are not fully committed to the peculiar tendencies 
of the people amongst whom they live. This fluidity, fragmentation and extra-local 
orientation raise considerable challenges to how we understand urban citizenship and 
the institutions intended to foster collective, local action. 
The discussion of inclusion for those who may be seeking ‘usufruct’ rights or 
opportunities for transit raises broader questions about the issues of rights and duties 
associated with belonging. Much of the philosophical literature on cosmopolitanism and 
participation—a form of inclusion that recognizes, if not celebrates, diversity—demands 
mutual recognition and a set of at least minimal reciprocal obligations among all 
residents. While many authors focus on state obligations to build inclusive societies, and 
others speak about countering xenophobia or other forms of discrimination, these 
imperatives typically stem from a model of political community comprising those who 
wish to be part of it and where parties at least minimally recognize each other’s 
legitimacy and right to space. In environments where significant elements of an urban 
population—citizens and aliens—exist outside official recognition or in violation of 
official policy, the terms of engagement are significantly altered. Without the presence 
of an alternative moral authority, there will be increasingly heterogeneous normative 
frameworks operating within Africa’s urban spheres.  
There are difficult ethical and institutional issues to be addressed in translating the 
processes and trends described in the previous pages into planning prescriptions. If 
building cities means facilitating some form of participation among all urban residents, 
domestic and international migrants’ intentions and ways of living present an acute 
challenge. Throughout much of the policy-oriented literature on urban inclusion and 
belonging among immigrants, the state, its agents and civil society fight, collaborate and 
negotiate patterns of inclusion and exclusion. This model assumes a state that is deeply 
embedded in the social, economic and institutional lives of those it ostensibly governs. 
Such presumptions may reflect European, North American and some Latin American 
countries where history has situated the state at the heart of socio-economic life (see 
Bendix 1977; Dean 1996; Marshall 1950). Although Africa’s colonial and post-colonial 
cities have been the one geographic site where the state’s influence is most evident 
(Bratton 2006; Herbst 2000), it is rare to see an effective, centralized authority in 
contemporary urban Africa (see Bayart 1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Where formal 
laws and institutions exist, their power rarely extends systematically beyond the central 
business districts, government bureaucracies and wealthy residential suburbs. And even 
here, effective power is often shared in ad hoc ways with private security firms and 
landowners who consciously fragment and delimit the state’s authority (Ballard 2005; 
Dirsuweit 2002; see also Caldeira 1996). As the recent violence in and around 
Johannesburg so dramatically and tragically reveals, it is mobs and mafias who are often 
the true sovereigns of African city streets (see Landau and Monson 2008; Misago, 
Landau and Monson 2009). Elsewhere, urban governance regimes are characterized by 
patronage politics, irregular policing and neglect (benign and otherwise).  
For these and other reasons, the state’s position as the centre of policy formation, protest 
and service delivery is far from assured in Africa’s cities. Consequently, many urban 
residents effectively live in the ‘brown areas’ beyond its direct influence (see O’Donnell 
2004). These are not necessarily spaces outside the realm of government influence or  
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‘non-state spaces’ (see Scott 1998). They are, rather, areas where state action has only 
indirect or partial influence, influence that is often evident only in efforts to elude or 
hinder policy. With neither embedded state institutions nor a population—citizens and 
non-citizens—who wish to engage with them, building inclusive and sustainable cities 
means fundamentally rethinking the ethics and mechanisms of participation and urban 
citizenship. 
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